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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early 2011, China announced plans to build a “city-sized cloud 
computing and office complex that will include a mega data center,” 
signaling a rapid growth in information technology (IT) spending.1  
Meanwhile, Facebook is building a 300,000-square-foot “server farm” in 
northern Sweden to store the personal data of its European users.2  In late 
2011, U.S.-based company Amazon.com announced the release of its Kindle 
Fire tablet, a device that not only backs up all of the user’s information in the 
cloud, but also uses the cloud to log all of that user’s activity.3 
As the world becomes increasingly digitalized, concerns arise about the 
security and privacy of personal and commercial information.  This 
information is being steadily moved to “the cloud,” an Internet-based service 
that “provide[s] consumers with vast amounts of cheap, redundant storage 
and allow[s] them to instantly access their data from a web-connected 
computer anywhere in the world.”4  However, this convenience comes with 
risks such as exposure to hackers and privacy invasion.  
This Note will argue that the government regulations currently in place in 
the U.S., European Union (EU), and China are inadequate to protect the 
privacy of cloud consumers.  The Note begins by defining cloud computing 
and its ramifications on the privacy of its users.  It will then set out laws that 
govern cloud computing in the U.S., EU, and China, and demonstrate how 
they are outdated and insufficient to protect cloud users.  Finally, this Note 
will recommend that countries adopt a uniform, updated definition of cloud 
computing while continuing to develop privacy policy according to their own 
national and regional interests. 
 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Patrick Thibodeau, China Building a City for Cloud Computing, COMPUTERWORLD.COM 
(Feb. 7, 2011, 5:59 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9208398/China_building_ 
a_city_for_cloud_computing. 
 2 Rob Waugh, That’s Really Cool: Facebook Puts Your Photos into the Deep Freeze as It 
Unveils Massive New Five Acre Data Center Near Arctic Circle, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 28, 2011, 
9:48 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2054168/Facebook-unveils-massive-
data-center-Lulea-Sweden.html#ixzz1dYknZf9L. 
 3 David Behrens, Tech Talk: New Kindle under a cloud, YORKSHIRE POST (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/lifestyle/indoors/gadgets-and-tech/tech_talk_new_kindle_und 
er_a_cloud_1_3896956. 
 4 Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back 
Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 360–61 (2010). 
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II.  CLOUD COMPUTING 
A.  Defining Cloud Computing  
The cloud computing model is perceived to be “the future of 
computing.”5  However, a debate exists over the formal definition of “cloud 
computing.”6  The National Institute of Standards & Technology describes 
cloud computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction.”7  Generally speaking, cloud computing is the 
idea that software and data can be accessed as a service on the Internet rather 
than stored locally on one’s own computer.8  Cloud computing pledges to 
overcome problems presented by the “dispersed computing” structure, the 
traditional model of computing in which each user stores and accesses his 
personal information on one computer.9  Electronic mail was the first to 
transition,10 closely followed by companies like Google, Amazon, and 
eBay.11  The global cloud computing industry is still developing, with a 
majority of technology experts predicting that by 2020 “most people will 
access software applications online and share and access information through 
the use of remote server networks.”12 
B.  Benefits of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing offers five major benefits to both commercial and 
individual consumers: reduced cost, increased storage, alleviated the 
depended on information technology (IT) personnel, augmented reliability, 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Id. at 364.  
 6 William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud Computing and 
Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010). 
 7 PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF 
CLOUD COMPUTING, SPEC. PUBL’N 800-145, at 2 (2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/public 
cations/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf. 
 8 Paul Lanois, Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing, and Privacy?, 9 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 29 (2010).  
 9 William J. Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the 
Store Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1200 (2010).  
 10 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 363. 
 11 Denny, supra note 6, at 237. 
 12 Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW INTERNET (June 11, 
2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1623/future-cloud-computing-technology-experts. 
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and expanded accessibility.13  First, most cloud services are “either free or 
significantly cheaper than more traditional desktop offerings.”14  Second, 
cloud computing has eliminated user concerns about a computer’s storage 
capacity, memory, and updates since applications run directly from the 
cloud.15  Thus, hard disk space that would have been taken up by traditional 
software is available for other uses.16  Third, business users benefit because 
IT personnel no longer need to be concerned with keeping software up to 
date.17  Fourth, cloud-based services regularly back up files stored on 
multiple servers so that users never have to worry about losing their data in 
the event of a hardware failure.18  Fifth, cloud-based systems allow users to 
access their information from anywhere in the world where there is an 
Internet connection.19 
C.  Privacy Issues in the Cloud 
Although cloud computing offers many advantages to business and 
consumer users, significant risks come with the massive amounts of sensitive 
data handled by cloud providers.20  One such risk is vulnerability to 
computer hackers as user data is often transmitted via unencrypted network 
connections, making the access to obtain users’ private information easy for 
hackers.21  Although encryption protecting against hackers is used in some 
cases of lower-priority cloud services such as email, it only applies during 
the initial login phase and not during subsequent data transfers.22  For 
example, the risk of data breach is increased when users are connected to 
unsecured public wireless networks, such as those at coffee shops.23  In 
addition, because a cloud provider might store the data of multiple users on 
the same physical equipment, cloud users face the risk of isolation failure, 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 365; see also Six Benefits of Cloud Computing, SYS-CON 
MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://web2.sys-con.com/node/640237 (listing six ways in 
which the public sector and government IT organizations could benefit from cloud 
computing).  
 14 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 366.  
 15 Lanois, supra note 8, at 29–30. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Six Benefits of Cloud Computing, supra note 13.  
 18 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 366.  
 19 Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act 
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 617, 622 (2011).  
 20 Denny, supra note 6, at 238.  
 21 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 372. 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. at 373. 
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i.e., an attack on one person may lead to a “guest-hopping” attack as a result 
of the inadvertent or intentional commingling of data.24   
A factor that exacerbates this issue is the changing societal attitude 
toward online privacy.25  Younger users “have much less concern about 
online privacy than older generations,” and “are more likely to embrace the 
Internet’s interconnectedness and convenience by participating in social 
networking, sharing digital content, and using cloud services.”26  To them, 
“values such as cost, convenience, efficiency, and networking” outweigh 
privacy concerns.27 
Cloud users also face possible exposure from cloud providers.28  
Institutions such as banks and online merchants are legally liable for online 
fraud, so they have an incentive to encrypt customers’ data as it is 
transmitted over the Internet.29  Cloud providers, however, have no such 
liability concerns even though an email account may have information that is 
just as sensitive as the information in a bank account.30  One way cloud 
providers could be forced to standardize encryption is through market 
pressure.  However, due to “widespread (yet understandable) ignorance” of 
most users31 and the current societal attitudes,32 “[t]here simply isn’t 
sufficient market demand for these providers to allocate the considerable 
financial and engineering resources required to [provide] encryption by 
default for all of their products.”33 
Since data is stored on servers worldwide, cloud-based services also bring 
into play the question of jurisdiction.34  The existing legal structure intended 
to protect data that flows around the globe is insufficient to protect end 
users.35  Data privacy laws are not globally uniform, and, as such, “data that 
might be secure in one country may not be in another.”36  The determination 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off My Cloud: Defining and Protecting the Metes and 
Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 283, 296–97 (2010). 
 25 Robison, supra note 9, at 1237. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 378. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 379. 
 31 Id. at 380. 
 32 Robison, supra note 9, at 1237. 
 33 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 380. 
 34 Lanois, supra note 8, at 44; see also Kevin J. O’Brien, Cloud Computing Hits Snag in 
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at B4 (noting that India and Malaysia are “growing hubs 
for cloud computing data centers”). 
 35 O’Brien, supra note 34.  
 36 David Binning, Top five cloud computing security issues, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Apr. 
24, 2009, 2:36 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/01/12/235782/Top-five-
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of whose law applies to information stored in the cloud may depend on 
factors such as “the type of user, the location of the user’s computer, the 
location of the cloud provider’s server(s), or some combination of these 
variables.”37  Due to these variables, a user’s privacy may “vary significantly 
with the terms of service and privacy established by the cloud provider,” 
leading to the abuse and exploitation of that user’s information.38 
Another threat to consumer privacy stems from the “ease with which the 
government can force an application provider to insert a backdoor or flaw in 
its own products.”39  For example, China, notorious for its rigid censorship of 
the Internet,40 recently demonstrated the extent to which the government 
could regulate Internet activities.  Skype is a “voice-over-IP software 
program that lets users make free peer-to-peer phone calls and conduct 
instant messaging over the Internet.”41  In China, Skype operates through 
TOM-Skype, a joint venture with Tom Group, and it dominates the Chinese 
market.42  The year after TOM-Skype was released, the company admitted 
that the software contained “a filtering mechanism that prevents users from 
sending text messages that include banned phrases such as ‘Falungong’ and 
‘Dalai Lama.’ ”43  Skype executives then confirmed that they had simply 
been complying with local Chinese law, and that other cloud providers such 
as Microsoft and Yahoo had all done the same.44  Although government 
intrusion was a risk before the era of cloud computing, “it has been made 
more effective, and more difficult to discover through the shift to cloud-
delivered software.”45 
                                                                                                                   
cloud-computing-security-issues.htm#4. 
 37 Barry Reingold et al., Cloud Computing: Whose Law Governs the Cloud? (Part III), 
CYBERSPACE LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 1, 1. 
 38 Lanois, supra note 8, at 44. 
 39 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 423.  
 40 See China Tightens Internet Controls, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010, 12:32 PM), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8530378.stm (noting that China practices “extensive censorship” of the 
“world’s biggest online population). 
 41 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 407–08. 
 42 Sui-Lee Wee & Chris Buckley, Skype’s Partner Says It Is Legal in China, REUTERS (Jan. 
4, 2011, 9:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/04/us-china-skype-idUSTRE703 
1DR20110104. 
 43 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 408. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 423–24. 
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III.  DATA PRIVACY LAWS AND THE NEED FOR REFORM IN THE UNITED 
STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, AND CHINA 
A.  European Union 
In approaching the privacy issues surrounding cloud computing, the EU 
has focused on privacy as a fundamental right46 in developing “minimum 
standards for the E.U. member states’ . . . data privacy legislation.”47  The 
1995 European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (EU Directive)48 
“standardized the requirements for the protection of personal information 
across all the countries within the EU.”49 Specifically, the EU Directive:  
1. limits organizations’ right to collect personal 
information, including restricting the amount of 
information to be gathered and limiting such 
collection to a specific permitted purpose; 
2. requires certain organizations to obtain the consent of 
the data subject prior to using the personal data or 
disclosing such data to a third party; and 
3. regulates transborder flows of personal data, 
effectively prohibiting organizations from exporting 
personal data to countries without adequate privacy 
laws (which includes the United States).50 
The EU Directive was superseded in 2002 by the Directive on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications (2002 ePrivacy Directive).51  As 
continuation of earlier privacy legislation policy efforts, the 2002 ePrivacy 
Directive sets forth two main obligations: first, providers of electronic 
communications services “must take appropriate technical and 
organi[z]ational measures to safeguard security of its services,”52 and, 
second, EU member states are required to maintain confidentiality of 
                                                                                                                   
 46 Lanois, supra note 8, at 37.  
 47 Vadim Schick, Data Privacy Concerns for U.S. Healthcare Enterprises’ Overseas 
Ventures, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 173, 180 (2011).  
 48 Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 49 Lanois, supra note 8, at 37. 
 50 Schick, supra note 47, at 180. 
 51 Council Directive 2002/58, Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002 
O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC).  
 52 Id. art. 4(1).  
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personal information.53  More importantly, member states must restrict 
“listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of 
communications and the related traffic data by persons other than users”54 
unless the user is “provided with clear and comprehensive information.”55  
Although the update of the EU Directive was a step forward in privacy 
legislation, it did not provide guidance about “how and when the opportunity 
to refuse the storage of, or access to the information, needs to be given, 
leaving each EU Member State . . . free to provide its own interpretation on 
these issues.”56 
In 2009, the 2002 ePrivacy Directive was amended to increase individual 
privacy protections.57  One major change in the 2009 ePrivacy Directive is 
the amendment of Article 5(3), which now provides: 
Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or 
the gaining of access to information already stored, in the 
terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on 
condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or 
her consent, having been provided with clear and 
comprehensive information . . . about the purposes of the 
processing.58 
Experts are split regarding the actual application of this change and how it 
relates to the rest of the Directive.  One view is that Article 5(3), requiring 
the user’s consent, conflicts with the Preamble of the Directive, which refers 
to both the “right to refuse” and “consent.”59  The Preamble states that users 
“engaging in any activity which could result in such storage or gaining of 
access” must have a “right to refuse” the obligation to provide information 
after being presented with “clear and comprehensive information” regarding 
such information.60  Another term requires “the user’s consent to 
processing.”61  A right to refuse can be viewed as an “opt-out,” in which “an 
activity occurs unless the user stops the processing and indicates his 
opposition.”62  In contrast, consent is an “opt-in,” which “implies that no 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Id. art. 5(1). 
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. art. 5(3). 
 56 Lanois, supra note 8, at 16. 
 57 Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11–36 (EC). 
 58 Id. art. 2(5). 
 59 Id. art. (66). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Francoise Gilbert, 2002 EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (As 
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activity can occur unless the user has done some act that expresses his 
consent.”63  The varying interpretations of the terms in the amended Article 
5(3) and Preamble “may result in significant discrepancies in the laws of the 
different Member States, the opposite effect . . . of a directive.”64  Another 
view concerning the inclusion of both of these terms is that the EU meant to 
“emphasize that the user must be presented with a clear choice and must be 
able to give ‘any freely given specific and informed indication of his 
wishes.’ ”65  Given the EU’s historical emphasis on personal privacy, the EU 
most likely fashioned the Directive in order to protect individuals through 
both opt-in and opt-out measures.   
Although experts disagree about the conflicting terminologies, they 
mutually agree that the 2009 ePrivacy Directive does not answer the question 
of how the user’s consent will be obtained.66  The 2009 ePrivacy Directive 
states that “the user’s consent to processing may be expressed using the 
appropriate settings of a browser or other application.”67  A user would 
express consent through the settings on his browser so that it reflects his 
individual privacy preferences.68  However, less sophisticated users are less 
likely to be aware of their ability to change the default settings chosen by the 
manufacturer of the Internet browser,69 which is usually set to a low level of 
privacy protection.70  This assertion is supported by the Data Protection 
Working Party (Working Party), an independent advisory body on data 
protection and privacy created by Article 29 of the EU Directive.71  The 
Working Party issued an opinion stating that “[i]t is a fallacy to deem that on 
a general basis data subject inaction . . . provides a clear and unambiguous 
indication of his/her wishes.”72  The question of browser setting choices thus 
                                                                                                                   
Amended by Directive 2009/136/EC), in ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND DATA 
SECURITY LAW 49, 62 (2010).  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 63. 
 65 Lanois, supra note 8, at 17 (quoting Council Directive 95/46, supra note 48, art. 2). 
 66 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 62, at 62–63 (arguing that the user’s expression of consent 
through an Internet browser causes confusion). 
 67 2009 O.J. (L 337) 20 at (66). 
 68 See Lanois, supra note 8, at 17 (“[W]hen the user has set his or her browser settings to 
reject cookies, then such a privacy setting would be sufficient to indicate his or her refusal to 
allow the content provider to store information or gain access to information stored on the 
computer.”). 
 69 See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 62–63 (noting that less sophisticated Internet users choose 
the setting determined by the manufacturer of the product). 
 70 See Lanois, supra note 8, at 20 (stating that three major Internet browsers have default 
settings allowing the free flow of cookies, technology used to track users as they browse the 
Internet).  
 71 Council Directive 95/46, art. 29, 1995 O.J. (L 281). 
 72 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioral 
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brings up the question of consent or, more specifically, the extent to which 
users can consent when they are not aware of what they are consenting to.73 
Despite these updates, however, EU legislation remains obsolete.74  In 
2010, the European Commission (EC) had experts draft a report on the future 
of cloud computing in the European Union.75  The report noted that the 
current legislation is vague and not inclusive of developments in cloud 
computing technology.76  The findings of the report reflect the legal 
recommendations made by the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) in their 2009 report, which included a detailed risk 
assessment of cloud security.77  The ENISA Report called for clarification of 
certain terms as well as the re-examination of concepts such as “transferring 
data” in light of new technological developments since the 2009 ePrivacy 
Directive was drafted.78 
The USA Patriot Act of 200179 (Patriot Act) presents further barriers to 
widespread European acceptance of the cloud.80  The Patriot Act “expands 
law enforcement’s surveillance and investigative powers and grants the U.S. 
government the right to demand data on the grounds of homeland security.”81  
As a result of the broad right of surveillance granted in the Patriot Act, 
European customers fear that the U.S. government could gain access to 
sensitive information in the course of an investigation.82  In addition, the EU 
                                                                                                                   
Advertising, WP 171, at 14 (June 22, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/p 
rivacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf. 
 73 Lanois, supra note 8, at 17 (“[C]an informed consent be validly implied if the user has 
not changed the browser’s default settings that are set to allow all cookies?”). 
 74 See id. at 31 (contending “there is still some uncertainty regarding the extent of the rules 
within a cloud computing environment” within the European Union).  
 75 See Lutz Schubert, The Future of Cloud Computing: Opportunities for European Cloud 
Computing Beyond 2010, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ic 
t/ssai/docs/cloud-report-final.pdf. 
 76 See id. at 46 (“[T]here are plenty unsolved legalistic issues yet to be addressed, in 
particular related to the location of data and / or code.”). 
 77 Daniele Catteddu & Giles Hogben, Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks, and 
Recommendations for Internet Security, EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
AGENCY  [hereinafter ENISA Report], available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliv 
erables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment. 
 78 Id. at 84–85 (calling for clarification of terms such as “Joint Controller,” research about 
the effect of data transfers to countries that do not meet the security threshold set by the EU 
Directive, etc.). 
 79 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
 80 See Denny, supra note 6, at 239 (noting that European companies are hesitant to have their 
data stored on computers in the U.S. government would be able to easily access that data). 
 81 Lanois, supra note 8, at 24. 
 82 Id. 
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Directive puts “stringent standards on the collection of electronic data by the 
government and by any other entity.”83  The EU Directive allows information 
to be transferred outside of the EU only if the receiving country ensures an 
“adequate” level of protection—the United States is not deemed to be one of 
these countries.84 
In order to promote European development of cloud-based services, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission developed the 
International Safe Harbor Certification program,85 which provides a 
framework of data protection principles.86 The goal of the Safe Harbor 
framework is to “permit the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S. 
while assuring an ‘adequate’ privacy protection overseas.”87  The safe harbor 
framework allows U.S. organizations to “self-certify” that their standards 
comply with the EU Directive’s standard of an “adequate level of 
protection”88 and also adhere to the Safe Harbor principles: notice, choice, 
onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and enforcement.89  Despite 
these measures, however, international companies are still hesitant to enter 
the EU cloud computing market.90 
B.  United States 
In contrast to the overarching regulations of the EU, privacy legislation 
development in the U.S. “has been very fragmented and sector-specific.”91  
In addition, many impediments hinder the judicial and legislative 
development of privacy protections in the context of cloud computing.  
                                                                                                                   
 83 Denny, supra note 6, at 239. 
 84 Lanois, supra note 8, at 27. 
 85 U.S.–E.U. Safe Harbor Framework, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp 
(last updated Mar. 31, 2011). 
 86 David Satola & Henry L. Judy, Towards a Dynamic Approach to Enhancing 
International Cooperation and Collaboration in Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks: 
Reflections on the Proceedings of the Workshop on Cybersecurity Legal Issues at the 2010 
United Nations Internet Governance Forum, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1745, 1765 (2011). 
 87 Lanois, supra note 8, at 29.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Shick, supra note 47, at 185. 
 90 See O’Brien, supra note 34 (noting that it is costly and time-consuming to prepare EU-
mandated service agreements between data processors and cloud computing providers located 
in countries that have not been approved by the EU to provide cloud computing services). 
 91 Symposium, It’s All About Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security Obligations in Global 
Privacy and E-Transactions Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2007). 
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1.  The Judicial Perspective 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that this right “shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”92  
The Fourth Amendment is therefore designed to protect against the search of 
private documents such as a person’s diary, personal letters, and other 
property.93  The emergence of cloud computing has led to questions about 
the extent of Fourth Amendment protections regarding individual privacy in 
the framework of new technologies.94 
Cloud service users often depend on cloud providers to provide sufficient 
security for their information.95  However, courts have held that the Fourth 
Amendment doctrine precludes an expectation of privacy when information 
is provided to a third party.96  The reason for this conclusion is the third-
party doctrine, the idea that people have no expectation of privacy in the 
information communicated with a third party.97  The third-party doctrine was 
applied in Wilson v. Moreau, in which the court held that a public library 
employee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because “[t]he 
library was an open and public work environment, the computers were 
available for public use, the stored documents were accessible to other 
computer users, and whatever e-mails that were stored in the system had 
been disseminated or received over the shared network.”98  This case and 
others applying the Fourth Amendment suggest “that courts are unlikely to 
enhance privacy protections for cloud computing users.”99  The lack of 
Fourth Amendment protections in this context may result in “online service 
providers [being] compelled to reveal their customers’ private documents 
with a mere subpoena.”100  Thus, although the third party doctrine is not the 
main reason for the lack of privacy online, its application by the courts “is 
                                                                                                                   
 92 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 93 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 390.  
 94 Kattan, supra note 19, at 623. 
 95 See Soghoian, supra note 4, at 375 (noting the extent of data, such as bank account 
information, that is stored on web-based services). 
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose . . . .”). 
 97 Id. at 442. 
 98 Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 104 (D.R.I. 2006). 
 99 Robison, supra note 9, at 1232. 
 100 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 391. 
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certainly the current tool of choice for the government’s evisceration of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .”101 
2.  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored 
Communication Act 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted by 
Congress in 1986.102  The ECPA was designed to increase privacy protection 
in the face of developing technologies by requiring law enforcement to 
adhere to a higher standard when attempting to access electronic data.103  
Among other provisions, the ECPA prohibits, with some exceptions, 
attempted or actual interceptions and disclosures of “any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication.”104  However, the ambiguous definition of 
“intercept” depends on an archaic interpretation of “communication.”105  
Intercept is defined as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any 
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device.”106  This definition should apply to data stored 
in the cloud, but “courts have struggled to clarify” the meaning of 
communication.107  For instance, in United States v. Ropp, the court 
dismissed charges against an employer who attempted to eavesdrop on the 
computer activities of one of his employees using KeyKatcher, a program 
that records the electronic signals generated by depressing keys on a 
keyboard.108  The court based its decision on the fact that this interception 
did not fall under the ECPA’s definition of “electronic communication” 
because it was stored on local computer hardware, the computer’s Central 
Processing Unit, and was never transmitted through a network.109  This 
ruling was based on the traditional model of computing in which users must 
actively connect to the Internet, and are only connected for short periods of 
time.110  However, in the world of cloud computing, where internet users are 
always connected, this interpretation of “electronic communication” is no 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Id. 
 102 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006)). 
 103 Martin, supra note 24, at 305.  
 104 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). 
 105 Martin, supra note 24, at 305. 
 106 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006). 
 107 Martin, supra note 24, at 305. 
 108 United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  
 109 Id. at 837–38. 
 110 Martin, supra note 24, at 306. 
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longer valid.111  The problem of interpretation here may also cause confusion 
when applying other parts of the ECPA. 
The Stored Communication Act (SCA) was enacted by Congress as part 
of the ECPA to protect information kept in electronic storage.112  Congress 
sought to regulate two primary uses of computer networks: (1) electronic 
communication service (ECS), which is defined as “any service which 
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications,”113 and (2) remote computing services (RCS), which are 
“intended to provide outsourced computer processing and data storage.”114  
A remote computing service is defined as “the provision to the public of 
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic 
communications system.”115 
The SCA offers different protections depending on the characterization of 
the service (ECS or RCS).116  Data stored with an RCS “receives fewer 
privacy protections than communications held by an ECS.”117  Most cloud 
computing services can fall within the definition of either category, which 
could potentially lead to confusion in applying the SCA.118  For messages 
stored in an ECS for 180 days or less, the SCA requires that law enforcement 
obtain a search warrant.119  If the message has been stored for 180 days, law 
enforcement can gain access using the lower RCS threshold.120  However, 
when it comes to nongovernmental entities users may have less privacy 
control over their personal identifying information such as name, physical 
and e-mail addresses, and IP address.121  A service provider “may divulge a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such 
service to any person other than a governmental entity.”122  The government 
can also compel service providers to disclose personal information through 
an administrative subpoena.123   
                                                                                                                   
 111 See id. (noting that broadband Internet connections in today’s society “are always on, 
always connected”). 
 112 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
 113 Id. § 2510(15). 
 114 Robison, supra note 9, at 1205. 
 115 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006). 
 116 Kattan, supra note 19, at 631.  
 117 Robison, supra note 9, at 1208. 
 118 Martin, supra note 24, at 307. 
 119 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).  
 120 Id. § 2703(b).  
 121 Robison, supra note 9, at 1208.  
 122 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2006). 
 123 Id. § 2703(c)(2).  
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Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. is one example of the difficulty 
courts face in determining whether a service is an ECS or RCS.124  In Quon, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a text-messaging service was an ECS despite the 
fact that the service provider had archived the messages and offered remote 
messaging services.125  When determining that the service was an ECS, the 
court relied on the legislative history of the SCA.126  Unfortunately, this 
legislative history dated back to 1986, and the law was formed based on the 
definitions of technology at that time.127  The court’s approach thus relies on 
definitions based on obsolete technology in an environment where these 
distinctions no longer matter.128 
These issues with interpretation of the SCA demonstrate that it “fails to 
provide a clear framework for understanding whether a user has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his communications stored in the cloud.”129  
Therefore, although the ECPA does provide certain privacy protections 
against law enforcement,130 it has not caught up to the advancements 
introduced by cloud computing.131 
3.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
In 1986, Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in 
order to address computer hacking,132 but it has been broadened to include 
both civil and private rights of action for breaches of the Act.133  The CFAA 
prohibits 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 125 Id. at 902. 
 126 Id. at 901. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Martin, supra note 24, at 307. 
 129 Kattan, supra note 19, at 645. 
 130 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006) (prohibiting law enforcement from the use of illegally 
intercepted wire or oral communication); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (requiring that law 
enforcement follow a detailed process to obtain authorization to intercept communication). 
 131 Kattan, supra note 19, at 648 (“In 1986, when ECPA was passed, the Internet consisted 
of a few thousand computers . . . .  There were no web pages, because the web had not been 
invented. Google would not be founded for another decade. Twitter would not be founded for 
another two decades.” (quoting ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Edward W. Felten, Professor of 
Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University))). 
 132 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)). 
 133 Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two 
Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 429 (2009). 
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(1) the unauthorized access and disclosure of data that 
“could be used to the injury of the United States,” 
(2) the unauthorized acquisition of data from financial 
institutions, U.S. agencies, or a private computer 
used in interstate commerce, 
(3) unauthorized access to a U.S. department or 
agency computer, 
(4) unauthorized access to a protected computer with 
knowledge and the intent to defraud and obtain 
something of value 
(5) the intentional damage of a protected computer, or 
an intentional transmission of a program that 
causes damage to a protected computer  
(6) the intentional trafficking of passwords of 
protected computers with an intent to defraud, or 
(7) the threat to damage a protected compute with the 
intent to extort something of value.134 
Although the CFAA “seems to create a powerful deterrent to most 
computer crime,” it lacks the force to be an effective deterrent to 
cybercrime.135  For instance, felony penalties are only triggered when the 
damage exceeds $5,000 within a one-year period.136  However, actual 
damage is often “difficult to ascertain or quantify,” and programs that are 
installed on one date may not cause harm until much later.137  Thus, it would 
seem that the CFAA is yet another privacy law that needs to be updated to 
conform to the current cloud computing framework.  
C.  China 
Like the United States, China has passed some sector-specific laws,138 but 
cloud computing has not been directly addressed by Chinese law.139  
However, there are some sector-specific laws that could still apply to the 
                                                                                                                   
 134 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006). 
 135 Martin, supra note 24, at 308. 
 136 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2006).  
 137 Martin, supra note 24, at 308. 
 138 Donald C. Dowling, International Data Protection and Privacy Law, PRACTISING LAW  
INSTITUTE (Aug. 2009), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/367982f8-6dc9-478e-ab  
2f-5fdf2d96f84a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/30c48c85-a6c4-4c37-84bd-6a4851f87a 
77/article_IntlDataProtectionandPrivacyLaw_v5.pdf. 
 139 Sarah Xuan, Legal Issues Associated with Cloud Computing in China, HG.ORG (Nov. 23, 
2010), http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=20501. 
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cloud computing structure.140  First, Article 12 of the Ministry of Information 
Industry’s Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services 
Provisions states “[e]lectronic messaging service providers shall maintain the 
confidentiality of the personal information concerning the online subscribers 
and may not disclose the same to third parties without the subscribers’ 
consent . . . .”141  Second, Article 7 of the Computer Information Network 
and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations states “[t]he 
freedom and privacy of network users is protected by law,” adding “[n]o unit 
or individual may, in violation of these regulations, use the Internet to violate 
the freedom and privacy of network users.”142  This regulation could be 
applied to cloud computing to protect against Internet hackers and viruses.  
Another provision that could protect against hackers is Article 18 of the 
Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of 
International Networking of Computer Information in the People’s Republic 
of China, which states: 
Internet users are forbidden from entering certain computer 
systems without permission and illegally changing [third party] 
information; distributing malicious information, giving out 
information in other people’s names and violating others’ 
privacy through networks; developing and spreading computer 
viruses[,] and engaging in other activities in violation of 
legitimate rights and interests of networks and individuals.143  
Another potentially applicable regulation is the Interim Administrative 
Measures on Internet-based Transactions of Goods and Related Services 
(Interim Measures), which focuses on business-to-consumer (B2C), 
business-to-business (B2B) and consumer-to-consumer (C2C) activities.144  
                                                                                                                   
 140 Id.  
 141 Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services Provisions (promulgated by the  
Ministry of Industry and Info. Tech., effective Oct. 8, 2000), http://www.chinesewalker.cn/20  
09/08/15/ministry-of-information-industry-administration-of-internet-electronic-messaging-se  
rvices-provisions/.  
 142 Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management  
Regulations (promulgated by the Ministry of Pub. Sec., effective Dec. 30, 1997), http://www.  
lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/information-technology/computer-infor  
mation-network-and-internet-security-protection-and-management-regulations-1997.html. 
 143 Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of International 
Networking of Computer Information in the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Information Computerization Leaders Group of the State Council, effective Feb. 13, 1998), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6562. 
 144 Interim Measures for the Trading of Commodities and Services through the Internet 
(promulgated by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, May 31, 2010, 
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Although the Interim Measures are aimed at regulating e-commerce sites 
such as Taobao.com(C2C) and alibaba.com(B2B),145 its existence may 
indicate a trend toward regulation and increased consumer advocacy in 
China.  Thus, Chinese consumers may have their privacy protected against 
private corporations, but enjoy no such protection against the Chinese 
government.  
In the absence of clear legal guidelines specifically addressing cloud 
computing, the context in which the Internet and consumer privacy has 
developed should be analyzed.  In 2009, the International Data Corporation 
(IDC) estimated that only four percent of Chinese businesses were using 
cloud-based services.146  This is, in part, because China’s large state-owned 
businesses want to maintain control of IT assets, and are, therefore, 
suspicious of third-party services, such as cloud computing.147  However, 
although its usage of web-based technology “lags badly,” the fact that China 
has the world’s largest population of Internet users,148 and increasing Internet 
sophistication may play a factor in the development of cloud computing in 
China’s business sector. 
Despite most Internet users’ suspicion of the cloud, cloud computing 
development “benefits from a favo[ ]rable policy environment in China.”149  
China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has 
focused on cloud computing as a “key project” in China’s technological 
development.150  In 2010, the MIIT chose Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Hangzhou, and Wuxi to lead the way in cloud computing and development, 
and up to two trillion yuan in government funds are being devoted to 
telecommunications infrastructure investment.151  China’s city governments 
                                                                                                                   
effective July 1, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/interim-measures-for-supervisi 
on-and-management-of-internet-information-service-market-ito-trans-2.pdf. 
 145 Steven Chow, First Ecommerce Regulation Introduced in China, CHINA ONLINE 
MARKETING (June 1, 2010), http://www.china-online-marketing.com/news/laws-regulations/fi 
rst-ecommerce-regulation-introduced-in-china/. 
 146 Wayne Arnold, Regulations and Security Concerns Hinder Asia’s Move to Cloud 
Computing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at B8. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Christina Larson, The Man Behind Cloud Valley, TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http:// 
www.technologyreview.com/business/38726/?p1=BI. 
 149 Andrew McGinty, The Hazy Cloud – Legal Challenges for Delivering Cloud Computing 
in China, HOGAN LOVELLS, http://ehoganlovells.com/rv/ff0001f56ad18fc97abed201ea4aaf4ec 
ab5ac52/p=6 (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
 150 Gov’t Investment in Cloud Computing Essential, Says Microsoft, XINHUA (June 18, 
2010), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2011-06/18/content_22810819.htm; see also Tony 
Zhu, China’s Cloud Computing Market Could Reach RMB 1 tln by 2013, BUS. CHINA (Apr. 
12, 2011), http://en.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-4-12/4OMjMyXzIwOTg4OA.html (stating that 
the MIIT has earmarked 5 Chinese cities to pilot cloud computing development). 
 151 Henry Acland, China Focus: The Virtualization of a Nation, Cloud Computing in China 
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also have announced plans for significant investment in cloud computing 
development.152  In addition, the Chinese government, recognizing that cloud 
computing, as a developing industry, is lacking in regulation, has also 
pledged to develop more cloud regulations in the future.153 
The Chinese government’s eager endorsement of cloud computing may 
cause conflict with its privacy policy, which is widely recognized as the 
world’s strictest in regards to internet freedom.154  Although China’s 
Constitution provides for freedom of speech,155 China has zealously 
practiced internet censorship in the name of national security.156  In fact, 
China has enacted certain laws that permit the Chinese government to attain 
this private information in the name of state security.157  These laws prohibit 
information that endangers state security, deteriorates to the state’s honor, 
causes ethnic oppression, disseminates rumors that disrupt social stability, 
spreads pornography, undermines state religious policy, or “preaches the 
teachings of evil cults.”158  The terms of these regulations are “needlessly 
vague,” which results in over-censoring since users lack adequate guidelines 
as to what is or is not appropriate.159  While Chinese regulations signal a 
trend toward consumer protection against corporations, no protection is 
offered against government intrusion.  This discrepancy could hinder the 
development of cloud computing in China, especially as its increasingly 
Internet-savvy population moves its data to the cloud.  
                                                                                                                   
Takes Hold, XINHUA (June 29, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/ 
29/c_13956822.htm. 
 152 Shervin Bakhtiari, Cloud Computing in China – The Greatest Hurdle?, BUS. CLOUD 
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 153 MIIT: To develop planning standards of cloud computing, C114 (July 21, 2011, 2:10 
PM), http://www.cn-c114.net/575/a630404.html. 
 154 See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Says Web Control Follows the West’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES, 
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protect the ruling Communist Party against what it views as Web-based threats to its 
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 155 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 4, 1982, art. 35 (China). 
 156 See Jessica E. Bauml, It’s a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges 
Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 697, 707–08 (2011) (arguing that 
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President of the People’s Republic of China, effective Feb. 22, 1993), http://www.china.org. 
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 158 Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (promulgated by Decree No. 292 
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IV.  CORPORATE COMPLICITY 
Cloud users may also be subject to government intrusion via the cloud 
providers who protect their private data. For instance, China’s censorship 
laws impose obligations on foreign internet content providers, such as Yahoo 
and Microsoft.160  In 2006, the Chinese government succeeded in forcing 
Microsoft to shut down the blog of an outspoken government critic, Zhao 
Jing.161  In 2005, Chinese journalist Shi Tao was sentenced to ten years in 
prison for sending “state secrets” to foreign websites through his Yahoo 
account.162  The arrest was made possible by Yahoo’s offices, which handed 
over the information that was ultimately used to identify the account 
holder.163  Due to the Chinese government’s strict censorship policy, cloud 
computing corporations operating in China may have to compromise their 
customers’ privacy in order to satisfy the government’s demands. 
Cloud computing consumers in the U.S. and the EU may also be affected 
by such government-mandated corporate intrusion, though it may not be as 
overt as the cases in China.  Although American companies profess a 
devotion to their customers’ privacy to the press,164 critics argue that the only 
privacy interest actually being protected is the companies’ “own collection 
and commercial use of customer data and the extent to which they share it 
with other companies.”165  Customers are therefore not protected from 
intrusion by the government,166 and “firms are now regularly compelled to 
modify their products in order to facilitate the government’s interest in 
surveillance and search.”167  For example, a U.S. statute requires that both 
ECS and RCS providers must notify authorities upon learning of the 
presence of child pornography on their servers.168  Cloud providers are 
therefore obligated to “review content that has been flagged by their users or 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Id. 
 161 The Long March to Privacy, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2006), http://www.economist.com/no 
de/5389362. 
 162 US Rebukes Yahoo over China Case, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2007, 7:11 PM), http://news. 
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 163 The Long March to Privacy, supra note 161. 
 164 See Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging 
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 191–
92 (noting that companies such as Verizon, Google, and Microsoft are committed to 
protecting their customers’ privacy). 
 165 Id. at 193. 
 166 See id. (“Few companies effectively protect their customers’ data from intrusive 
government searches.”). 
 167 Soghoian, supra note 4, at 400.  
 168 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2006). 
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other third parties.”169  They are not, however, obligated to seek out such 
materials, although several ISPs have chosen to do so.170  Critics argue that 
this approach could lead to questionable information gathering because 
“once a technical infrastructure has been designed and deployed, service 
providers are not in a position to limit the extent to which they can be 
compelled to use it.”171 
Adopting a zero data retention policy is one way that cloud computing 
providers could protect costumers’ privacy.  When no information about the 
customer is stored, no information is available to the government.  Despite 
the fact that the costs of keeping data are increasingly cheap, the costs 
incurred by cloud providers through lawsuits and data breaches may provide 
a financial incentive for corporations to delete data.172  Although some IPSs 
in Sweden have enacted zero data retention policies in response to customer 
demands, none of the major American ISPs or telecommunications carriers 
have done so.173  As a result of the adoption of the zero data retention 
policies in Sweden, the head of the Swedish Police’s National IT crime unit 
noted that it has become “harder for the police to track down criminals 
carrying out serious crimes.”174  This response could echo the American 
government’s likely argument that if they were not able to force cloud 
providers to reveal customers’ information, it would be much more difficult 
to catch pedophiles and terrorists.   
Cloud computing has made government intrusion cheaper and easier to 
obtain than ever.175  A zero data retention policy may be available to 
corporations, but they are unlikely to adopt that policy because of business 
models such as Google’s, which “mines” the data of its users to provide 
targeted advertisements and generate revenue for itself.176  Thus, what is 
likely the most effective way to protect consumer privacy is through an 
overarching legal structure such as that of the EU. 
                                                                                                                   
 169 Soghoian, supra note 164, at 202. 
 170 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 362–63 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
AOL developed a program to scan its customers’ email attachments of child pornography).  
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V.  INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
A.  Barriers to International Cooperation  
Cultural standards may affect each region’s approach to privacy 
legislation.  For example, in the U.S., “Americans have been less likely than 
Europeans to turn to the government to regulate private enterprise, instead 
relying on the market or new technologies to address public concerns about 
commercial activity.”177  In contrast, the EU’s policy of strict protection of 
personal privacy is shaped by the brutal events of World War II.178  In China, 
less concern about personal privacy may be a result of the collectivist 
society,179 which calls for the sacrifice of personal privacy to benefit group 
efforts.180  However, although privacy has not traditionally been valued in 
China, the concept of privacy may be gaining currency as Western 
technology and attitudes continue to infiltrate Chinese society.181  The 
changing attitudes of the Chinese may be useful in drafting a cloud 
computing privacy policy that could be applied globally.   
The cultural discrepancies between these three diverse regions may be 
offset by the integration of the U.S., EU, and Chinese economies, which is 
reflected in areas such as “the number of corporate offices in each other’s 
jurisdictions and the significant personal data flows between the two 
economies.”182  Another important economic factor that may affect 
international cooperation in the area of cloud computing privacy policy is the 
“entangled and dependent” relationship between the U.S. and China.183  
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Although the relationship is complicated and strained,184 the 
interconnectedness of these two countries’ economies may provide 
incentives for both the U.S. and China to maintain a good relationship.  
B.  Proposals to Ensure Privacy in Cloud Computing 
In order to address the issues of privacy in the cloud, several industry, 
nonprofit, and government-sponsored groups have released proposals that 
should be considered in drafting a policy about this topic.  
One example of such a proposal is the Communication, subtitled “A 
comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union” 
(EU Communication), issued by the European Commission to the EU 
Parliament and the Council in November 2010.185  The EU Communication 
addresses the effects of cloud computing on privacy law, noting that changes 
will have to be made to legislation based on the international nature of data 
stored in the cloud.186  In addition, the EU Communication maintains the 
privacy focus of previous legislation but emphasizes that changes such as 
increased transparency to consumers need to be made in order to ensure 
personal privacy.187 
An alternative proposal is Microsoft’s Cloud Computing Advancement 
Act, a legislative and industry initiative designed to “promote innovation, 
protect consumers, and provide the [E]xecutive [B]ranch with the new tools 
needed for a new technology era.”188  Noting that the ECPA was enacted 
before the invention and utilization of current cloud technologies, the 
proposal advocates for an update to the ECPA to fill in the legal gaps in the 
current statute.189  The proposal also calls for bilateral and multi-lateral 
discussions between countries, with Congress taking the lead in the U.S. in 
helping “build consensus with other parliamentary holders.”190   
                                                                                                                   
 184 Matt Spetalnick & Doug Palmer, Obama to China: Behave Like a “Grown Up,” 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2011, 9:23 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/ 
us-apec-idUSTRE7AB12920111114?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=71. 
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Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, COM [2010] 609 final (Nov. 
4, 2010). 
 186 See id. at 4 (“Several stakeholders highlighted that the increased outsourcing of 
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to the processing and the allocation of associated responsibility.”). 
 187 Id. at 6. 
 188 Brad Smith, General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation, Address at the Brookings Institute 
Policy Forum, 19 (Jan. 20, 2010). 
 189 Id. at 21–22. 
 190 Id. at 30.  
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In terms of practical considerations, the first step for nations concerned 
about the privacy implications of cloud computing is to agree on a uniform 
definition of cloud computing.  This definition should be updated with 
regularity so that legislation can keep up with the rapid developments that 
are to come as the cloud computing industry develops.  Only with regular 
assessments about the applicability of existing law can cloud users be 
adequately protected.   
Along with regular updates, international actors should emphasize 
personal privacy as a focus of legislation regarding cloud computing.  The 
EU should build on its current policy of stringent privacy protection while 
striving to update its obsolete legislation.  The 2009 ePrivacy Directive 
should be updated, taking into consideration the recommendations of 
proposals, such as the EU Communication.  New policy should also seek to 
change the attitudes of European cloud users so that they feel more secure in 
storing their information in the cloud. 
In the U.S., Congress should eliminate the SCA’s ECS and RCS 
categories and the distinction between how these two categories are treated 
because they are outdated and confusing for courts to apply.  Furthermore, 
the ECPA should undergo a comprehensive overhaul that will result in a 
final product that reflects developing technologies and the privacy 
implications that go along with those developments.  Punishments for 
violations under the ECPA and the CFAA should, also, be reevaluated and 
made more severe; the existing punishment structure has not proven to be a 
clear deterrent against malicious online activity.  
While arguing that China should adopt a privacy policy that promises 
privacy from both the government and private corporations is easy, expecting 
the Chinese government to loosen its censorship in the face of new 
technologies is unrealistic.  American privacy law has had over two hundred 
years to develop, while China is still a maturing nation that has not had the 
time to develop their privacy framework.191  Thus, the best step may be to 
allow privacy protection in China to develop alongside cloud computing, 
letting market forces govern how privacy legislation is shaped.  By hesitating 
to block Google completely following a showing of support by Chinese 
citizens, the Chinese government has already shown that it is cognizant of 
foreign cloud providers as well as the attitude of its citizens.192  
Although government participation is important, cloud providers must 
protect the rights of its customers against the government and against 
themselves.  To that end, cloud providers should adopt policies that limit the 
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amount of data that they can retain.  Although a zero retention policy is 
likely unrealistic, a policy that strikes a balance between government 
interests and personal privacy would prove beneficial to all parties.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As more and more of our information is moved to the cloud, sources of 
intrusion increase: hackers, corporate data mining, and government 
surveillance.  Information that was once only available on one computer is 
now spread out on worldwide servers, bringing questions of jurisdiction and 
data safety. 
The legislative framework in the U.S., EU, and China are not equipped to 
deal with the new technology presented by cloud computing.  While 
legislation in the U.S. and EU are obsolete in the context of privacy in 
modern cloud computing, the Chinese government has no provisions for 
privacy against online government intrusion.  Corporations, also, play a role 
in assisting governments in violating the privacy of its citizens. 
In order to update cloud computing legislation with modern notions about 
personal privacy, cooperation needs to happen at the international level.  
Following international discussions on the definitions and implications of 
cloud computing, national legislators should implement laws that update 
modern Internet personal privacy, addressing issues such as increased 
punishment for violations and outdated definitions. 
  
